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PRACTICES, TACTICS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE
ZONING LITIGATOR
DON E. GLICKMAN*
The purpose of this article is to inform attorneys who try zoning
cases of some of the practices, considerations and legal standards, both
established and still developing, which will assist them in litigating zon-
ing cases.
The first consideration in a zoning case, as in any other case, is to
know the law and the elements of a prima facie case. The plaintiff who
challenges denial of rezoning must show that the zoning ordinance is
unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid. As summarized in one case:
An ordinance will be presumed to be valid, and the one attacking the
ordinance bears the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. The
challenging party must establish by clear and convincing evidence
that the ordinance as applied, is arbitrary and unreasonable and
bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare.'
The factors which the courts consider in making such a determina-
tion were enunciated in LaSalle National Bank of Chicago v. County of
Cook .2 These factors include: 1) the existing uses and zoning of
nearby property; 2) the reduction in property value resulting from the
particular zoning restriction; 3) the extent to which the destruction of
property values promotes the general health, safety and welfare of the
public; 4) the relative gain to the public as opposed to the hardship to
the owner; 5) the suitability of the property for the zoned purpose; and
6) the length of time the property has remained vacant, as zoned. In
addition to these established factors, two newer criteria have emerged.
These new criteria are (a) community need for the use proposed by the
property owner;3 and (b) whether there exists a reasonable comprehen-
sive plan encompassing the property at issue.4 Most communities have
prepared or are in the process of preparing comprehensive plans. Such
plans, along with the first criterion relating to existing uses and zoning,
are the most important factors.
* A.B., Miami University; J.D., University of Chicago, 1972. Mr. Glickman is a partner in
the litigation department at Rudnick & Wolfe, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Tomasek v. City ofDes Plaines, 64 Ill. 2d 172, 179-80, 354 N.E.2d 899, 903 (1976).
2. 12 111. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957).
3. Locker v. City of McHenry, 89 111. App. 2d 457, 231 N.E.2d 685 (2d Dist. 1967).
4. Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 I1. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (2d Dist. 1981).
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A consideration which one should always bear in mind is that the
case is likely to be appealed. Most zoning cases are appealed, and the
Illinois Appellate Court does not seem to hesitate to reverse a trial
judge. This is an extremely important consideration in building a rec-
ord. Large exhibits should be photographed so that they can easily be
reprinted in appellate briefs. Questions and the witnesses' answers
must be carefully framed with an eye to further scrutiny in a sterile
transcript.
Another consideration is that zoning cases are expert witness cases.
Thus, the litigator must be able to use and cross-examine experts ad-
vantageously. A lawyer can run all of his or her expert's names, as well
as the opposing expert's names through Lexis and/or Westlaw. By re-
viewing the cases where an expert's name appears, the lawyer may find
that a witness advocated a position contrary to the position he is es-
pousing in this case.
Administrative regulations and expertise must also be considered
when the advocate of a zoning change confronts technical questions
relating to the proposed uses of the property. There is an increasing
trend on the part of courts to recognize that agencies have considerable
expertise in particular areas and to defer to the agencies' findings. An
attorney can use agency representatives and regulations in several
ways. In direct examination, the litigator can call an agency represen-
tative as an expert or call an outside expert to testify about agency reg-
ulations. Alternatively, one can introduce the regulations into evidence
to support an expert's testimony. Similarly, on cross-examination,
agency personnel and/or regulations can be used to impeach an oppo-
nent's expert.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate this point. In one case, the
plaintiff sued for the rezoning of his property from agricultural to
multi-family.5 The defendant's witnesses objected to the rezoning on
the basis of drainage and related sewer system problems. The court
found that both of these so-called problem areas would be reviewed by
the sanitary district and would have to satisfy its standards before a
permit could be issued. Thus, the court deferred the decision on these
technical engineering details to the appropriate administrative agency
and confined its inquiry to land use questions. In another case,6 the
defendant refused to rezone the plaintiff's property to permit a re-
5. Smith v. County Board of Madison County, 86 111. App. 3d 708, 408 N.E.2d 452 (5th Dist.
1980).
6. Wright v. County of Winnebago, 73 I11. App. 3d 337, 391 N.E.2d 772 (2d Dist. 1979).
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stricted landing area. The Illinois Division of Aeronautics had control
over questions relating to the safety of such landing areas. The county
had refused to permit the use of the property as a landing area, citing
failure to meet administrative standards and safety problems. The
court not only stated that the county had no right to substitute its judg-
ment for the agency's determination of whether its technical standards
were met, but the court further deferred to the agency's overall evalua-
tion of safety. In yet another case,7 the defendant partly based its case
on the assertion that the plaintiff's proposed sewage disposal system
was unsafe. The court did not decide the very technical questions relat-
ing to the system's operational design, but instead deferred to the Illi-
nois Environmental Protection Agency's expertise, noting that the
IEPA had given preliminary approval of the plaintiffs proposed system
and would ultimately decide whether a permit would issue. Thus, the
court can often avoid deciding very technical engineering or safety
questions if the counsel makes proper use of agency rules and expertise.
The advocate of a zoning change must also be aware of and be
prepared to deal with, a conflict in the law of zoning as it relates to
comprehensive plans. One of the recently established judicial factors,
as noted earlier, is the municipality's comprehensive zoning plan.
However, the courts still weigh the six traditional criteria as enunciated
in LaSalle. Consideration of a comprehensive plan on the one hand
and the LaSalle factors on the other present an inherent conflict.
Comprehensive planning entails a long-term perspective and eval-
uation, projecting five, ten, twenty or more years into the future. The
plans, which are sometimes like wish lists, designate specific types of
land uses that the city fathers hope will occur. In contrast, the LaSalle
criteria focus on the past and present. For example, the court must
consider (current) surrounding uses and zoning, the period of time a
piece of property has been vacant or underutilized, and the immediate
dimunition in value the property suffers from the denial of the re-
quested zoning change.
Thus, the property owner and the municipality often approach
and present their cases in conflicting directions, one focusing on the
ideal future, the other on the hard present.
For the litigator, it is important to note that Illinois courts have
recently given more credence to comprehensive planning. The result of
7. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Palos Park, 106 Ill. App. 3d 394, 435 N.E.2d
1265 (lst Dist. 1982).
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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this is that plaintiffs have a greater burden in proving their case. The
plaintiffs are being pushed to the point of not only showing that the
value of their property is diminished, but that it is almost destroyed
and will not be utilized in the future if the current zoning plan remains
in effect.9 The burden on plaintiff, if the courts continue to emphasize
the importance of comprehensive planning, will approach the "taking"
standard which has been adopted in cases brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.10
In conclusion, the advocate must be aware of the increased
number of tools at his disposal as well as the uncertainties of a chang-
ing legal standard.
9. Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. County of Lake, 71 11. App. 3d 421, 389 N.E.2d 882 (2d
Dist. 1979); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 92 111. App. 3d 997, 416 N.E.2d 426 (2d Dist. 1981).
10. Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981).
